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NOTE
COMMON LAW INTERPLEADER IN EQUITY
A. In General
Where there is a dispute between two or more persons, and
the subject of the controversy is held by a third person who
admits he has no right to the thing held, but is willing to give
up the stakes according to the result of the dispute-that is, he is
merely a stakeholder-he may avoid the expense and danger of
defending two actions and a possible double recovery by giving
up the thing in dispute to the court. This being done the
stakeholder is no longer a substantial party to the action, and
the court directs that the persons between whom the dispute
really exists fight it out at their own expense.
The preceding is by no means an all-encompassing definition
of interpleader, but is intended, rather, to provide only a very
general description as a starting point.
A common situation appropriate to the use of interpleader
arises in the case of bailments when a bailee is confronted by
conflicting claims to the bailed property by the bailor and by an
alleged assignee of the bailor. The bailor, claiming that there
was no sale to the alleged assignee, or that the sale was fraudulent,
brings suit. The assignee also sues. Naturally, the bailee had
nothing to do with the sale, and evidence concerning it is not
readily available to him. Although he assumed one obligation,
he is faced with the prospect of a double suit and perhaps a
double recovery, since juries in both cases could find in favor of
the claimants without any error at law.
There are two early Virginia cases,' having substantially the
same fact situation, which provide a further illustration of the
remedy of interpleader in terms of local law. In Storrs v. Payne,2
decided in 1810, the complainant as sheriff of Henrico County,
took the goods and chattels of V. S. Moore under an execution
IStorrs v. Payne, 4 Hen. & M. (14 Va.) 566 (1810); Baird v. Rice, 1 Call
(5 Va.) 18, 1 Am. Dec. 497 (1797).
24 Hen. & M. (14 Va.) 566 (1810).
from the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond District
on behalf of one Taylor. The goods were also claimed by
Payne, a defendant in this action. The court held that the sheriff
might properly file bill of interpleader to settle the rights of the
parties.
The purpose and general principle of interpleader is simple,
just and ostensibly a very easy way out of a complex situation.
The applicant has admittedly incurred one obligation; he is faced
with two or more claims. Obviously, if one claim is right, the
others are wrong. It cannot be denied that on its face inter-
pleader possesses an attractiveness which is hardly equaled by any
other remedy known to our system of jurisprudence. "The mere
statement of the principle", declared Sir James Willis,8 "shows it
justice."
Still unmentioned, however, are the procedural aspects, the
vehicles by which the theory is given practical application. It is
here that the bright promise and sense of satisfaction derived
from the logic and justice of the purely philosophical concept
begins to fade. In fact, upon further study, the mind's reaction
is more likely to approximate exasperation, for one does not deal
with this facet of interpleader at length without meeting, at
every turn, niceties and technical quibbles not unlike those of
the common law writs.
That equity, the reputed antithesis and remedy of the rig-
idity of the common law, should bear this burden of "legal lore"
is disappointing, paradoxical and largely unjustifiable. Many of
the procedural rules are essential elements of the concept which
must be distinguished from those which have attached themselves
by historical accident and serve no real purpose.
The present status of the law is at least partially explained
by an examination of its origin and development, and although no
full treatment will be attempted, the following historical sketch
is included to prepare the reader for the discussion of the rules
of procedure in detail to follow and in the hope that it will be
at least a partial answer to the question, "why", that is bound to
arise regarding present procedure in interpleader.
The remedy of interpleader was not originated in equity
8 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 Yale L.J. 814 (1921).
but was adopted from the common law4 where it had a limited
application, primarily in actions of detinue in bailment cases.
With the passage of time, however, the action of trover was
used with increasing frequency, gradually replacing the less satis-
factory action of detinue. With trover, the relief in interpleader
could not be had at law, and recourse was had to the chancellor
who then began to grant interpleader in equity. This was done
at first with reluctance; and it is, perhaps, because of that re-
luctance that the chancellor felt compelled to apply it in equity
only in those instances where it would have been applied at law
had the action been detinue. But whatever the reason, it is
obvious that the chancellor was not compelled to follow this
procedure, because the chief reason for imposing such restric-
tions at law, the requirement that the controversy must be be-
tween two adverse parties, had never been the rule in equity.
Nevertheless, the result was the creation in equity of some-
thing closely resembling a technical form of action with an un-
necessary rigidity that has been retained over the centuries and
which even yet hinders its development and usefulness.
B. When Will the Action Lie
The basis of equity jurisdiction in the broad sense lies in the
inadequacy of the legal remedy and the prevention of a multi-
plicity of actions.5 The complainant, though willing to satisfy
whichever demand is proper, is exposed to the hazard, vexation
and expense of several legal actions. Manifestly, there is no
adequate remedy at law.
The action of interpleader will lie even though any or all of
the claims against the complainant are legal. Jurisdiction de-
pends upon distinct claims being made rather than upon their in-
trinsic nature as legal or equitable claims.
One seeking the remedy of interpleader must comply not
only with the ordinary procedural requirements of equity, but
4 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 5800-824 (1836); Chafee, Modernizing Inter-
pleader, 30 Yale L.J. 814 (1921); Rogers, Historical Origins of Inter-
pleader, 51 Yale L.J. 924 (1942).
5 Storrs v. Payne, 4 Hen. & M. (14 Va.) 566 (1810); Baird v. Rice, 1 Call
(5 Va.) 18, 1 Am.Dec. 497 (1797).
must also bring his case within a special set of procedural dic-
tates, rigidly drawn and peculiar to interpleader alone.
1. The first of these special procedural rules to be considered
here is that which requires a complainant seeking to interplead
adverse claims to prove to the satisfaction of the court that there
are in fact two valid claims against complainant, and that he has
only one obligation. One explanation of the generally reluctant
attitude of the courts in granting interpleader is that it is often
used to get a purely legal matter into equity, the only basis of
equity jurisdiction being the alleged double vexation, all other
issues to be-determined being legal. Frequently, a complainant,
being liable on one valid claim, will find it possible to "manu-
facture" another with the help of a friend in order to get into
equity, thus avoiding a jury trial at law.
Therefore, it is readily apparent that this first requirement
is a necessary one and places no undue burden upon the remedy
of interpleader.
2. Because of the nature of the remedy, it is essential that
the same thing, debt or duty be claimed by both parties against
whom interpleader is demanded.6 This produces no difficulties
as long as the subject of the dispute is a thing, but when a chose
in action is in dispute, its identity must be determined upon the
facts of each case and very nice distinctions are often the result.
In one case it was held that the demands were not the same
where one claimant claimed rent for certain premises and the
other claimed damages for their use and occupation.7 However,
this is no more than another manifestation of the same infirmity
that is found throughout the law when theory is attempted to be
given practical application. The difficulty is inherent in the
remedy itself.
3. It is a different matter, however, regarding the require-
ment for jurisdiction that the adverse title of the claimants must
be connected in some way, or dependent, or one derived from
the other, or both derived from a common source. In other
words, that they must not claim under titles hostile to one an-
'Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911); Bell Storage Co. v.
Harrison, 164 Va. 278, 180 S.E. 320, 100 AL.R. 419 (1935); 4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence S1323 (5th Ed.) (1941).
7 Dodd v. Bellows, 29 N.J.Eq. 127 (1878).
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other 8 This restriction, referred to briefly as privity, has acted,
perhaps more than any other, to tie the hands of equity for no
substantial reason in cases where relief should have been granted
and it has been the recipient of much criticism.
A tenant confronted with one suit for rent by his landlord
and a separate suit for rent by one who claims title paramount to
the landlord, will be denied interpleader for lack of privity be-
tween the contestants. If, however, the second claimant had
claimed as an assignee of the landlord, privity sufficient for juris-
diction would be established; one claim being dependent upon
the other. Similarly, it has been held that interpleader will lie
where suits are brought against the complainant debtor by a
creditor of complainant and an assignee of the creditor.9
The privity requirement is a senseless limitation upon the
jurisdiction of equity as it is obvious that a person may be ex-
posed to vexation and the peril of double recovery from con-
flicting independent claims as well as from conflicting dependent
claims. Pomeroy describes it as, ". .. a manifest imperfection
of the equity jurisdiction . . ..,o and the best thing that may be
said about it is that it is not always followed by the courts in all
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it has been held to be the rule in
Virginia.'1 The consensus is well expressed by Professor Chafee:
Whatever the psychological basis of this early insistence
upon privity, the conception has long proved an out-
worn historical impediment to justice ... "
4. It is further required that the complainant have no in-
terest in the subject matter and that if relief is granted, he should
be willing to place the res in the hands of the court and retire
from the action.'3 This restriction is rational where the com-
plainant denies both claims or where he retains a substantial
8 Haseltine v. Brickley, 16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 116 (1860).
9 Haseltine v. Brickley, 16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 116 (1860).
10 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1324 (5th Ed.) (1941).
11Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911); 1 Barton, Chancery
Practice, §11, (3rd Ed.) (1926).
12 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 Yale L.J. 814 at 835 (1921).
-
3 Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911); 1 Barton, Chancery
Practice, §II, (3rd Ed.) (1926).
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claim in the thing in controversy. Naturally, in such instances,
the complainant would not be willing to bring the res into court
and retire. On the other hand, if the complainant disputes a
small part of one or both claims or has a lien or set off, his in-
terest is small in comparison with the double vexation, and he
should be allowed to put the full amount claimed into court and
retire. The objection to this is found in the fact that inter-
pleader is in two distinct stages: The first in which the com-
plainant prays that he be allowed to interplead the conflicting
claims. If this relief is granted, complainant is entirely removed
from the suit and the following action, referred to as the second
stage, is between the defendants. There is no substantial reason,
however, why the complainant should not be allowed to voice
his claims in the res in a third stage against the contestant who
prevails in the second. Nor does there appear to be anything
other than custom in the way of allowing the complainant to
participate in the second stage and fight out his claim in a three-
cornered suit analogous to a bill of peace. The case of George
v. Pilcher14 illustrates that it is not absolutely essential that com-
plainant withdraw at the end of the first stage. In that case a
tenant interpleading rival heirs of his lessor was allowed to pay
accrued rents into court, but was retained in the suit subject to
the order to pay subsequent installments or rent in as they be-
came due. The case has not been followed, however, and any
interest in the subject matter of the dispute still defeats juris-
diction. 15
Along similar lines, the suit will not be heard if the com-
plainant has incurred some independent obligation, personal or
otherwise, to either of the defendants before final disposition of
the matter at issue.
In Bell Storage Company v. Harrison,0 complainant Com-
pany was denied interpleader when, purporting to act according
to Section 1322 of the Code of 1930, it sold furniture belonging
to appellee for failure to pay storage charges. The balance in
complainant's hands after the sale was claimed by appellee and
by a judgment creditor of appellee's husband. The complainant
14 28 Gratt (69 Va.) 299 at 305 (1877).
15 Runlde v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
16 164 Va. 278, 180 S.E. 320, 100 A.L.R. 419 (1935).
was granted interpleader, and in this action a decree was ren-
dered directing payment of the fund to the creditors. Shortly
thereafter, however, appellee petitioned for a rehearing alleging
that the complainant's claim was exercised and that the sale was
illegal and void because not in compliance with the statute. A
rehearing was granted and a final decree entered holding the sale
invalid and of no effect. The bill of interpleader was thereupon
dismissed because the complainant Company could no longer
stand indifferent as between the contesting parties. It had, by
placing itself in the position of a wrongdoer, incurred an in-
dependent liability to appellee.
The reason for denying the remedy of interpleader when
the complainant has incurred an independent liability to either
of the claimants is said to be that the proceeding would not de-
termine whether the party seeking interpleader was entirely free
from liability to either adverse claimant. This is true with regard
to the customary procedure, but, as suggested previously, there
is nothing in the nature of things which prevents the addition of
a third stage, in which the complainant may settle any matter be-
tween himself and one of the claimants, or permitting com-
plainant to participate in the second stage.
C. Time of Filing the Bill
A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence in bringing
the contending claimants into court, and it is not necessary that
he wait until conflicting writs are actually brought against him.
He may file his bill for interpleader within a reasonable time
after the dispute has arisen.
A complainant may generally interplead, with the court's
permission, after he has filed an answer in a suit against him. In
ordinary circumstances, however, he will be denied the remedy
when any claim has been reduced to judgment,'7 because of the
doctrine of laches or equitable estoppel, when the complainant
had notice of the conflicting claim prior to rendition of the judg-
ment.
7 Haseltine v. Brickley, 16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 116 (1860); Ayers v. More-
head's Adrn'r, 77 Va. 586 (1883); Hoge v. Fidelity Loan & Trust Co.,
103 Va. 1, 48 S.E. 494 (1904); Green v. Suttle & Massie, 21 Gratt. (62
Va.) 356 (1871).
In Haseltine v. Brickley,'8 complainant was indebted to one
Hicks to the extent of $725 for land purchased from Hicks.
Haseltine, in an action against Hicks, attached the debt owed to
Hicks by the complainant. Complainant testified at that trial
that he was indebted to Hicks in the amount of $725. Later in
the same year the second action was brought against complainant
on his note to Hicks by the assignee of that note and judgment
was had thereon. Complainant's plea that the claimants be re-
quired to litigate their respective rights to the fund was denied.
Justice Lee stated the law as follows:
When a party has had a day in which he could make
his defense in proper form, before a verdict and judg-
ment against him, equity will not entertain him and
grant relief after such verdict and judgment, unless in
cases of fraud, accident or surprise, or some adventitious
circumstances, unmixed with negligence on his part,
which shall sufficiently account for the omission to
seek the intervention before .judgment.19
Interpleader having been denied, complainant was liable on both
judgments.
The rule of Haseltine v. Brickley is not strictly applied,
however, in cases of defaulting administrators, nor when a trust
fund is effected. In Biedle v. Chrismon,20 the rule was not fol-
lowed when a trustee and personal representative allowed dual
default judgments for the same thing to be rendered against the
trust when the statute of limitations was available as a defense.
D. Parties to the Bill
The plaintiff or complainant in bill of interpleader remains
a necessary and substantial party until he has fully rendered the
debt or duty or other thing required of him.
Under the general rule for determining whether the requisite
diversity of citizenship exists to support the original jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, merely nominal parties or parties without
18 16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 116 (1860).
19 Haseltine v. Brickley, 16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 116 at 120 (1860).
20 76 Va. 678 (1882).
real interest may be disregarded. In the Pilcher case, supra, com-
plainant, a tenant of decedent, filed a bill of interpleader against
rival claimants of decedent's estate with respect to rents owing
by the complainant. The decree directed that the rent be paid
into the bank "from time to time" pending final outcome of the
suit, complainant being retained as a party until such time. The
claimants petitioned for removal to the federal courts on grounds
of diversity of citizenship existing between claimants, but re-
moval was not allowed because some of the claimants and com-
plainants were co-citizens of the same state, Virginia. There-
fore, until allowed to retire the complainant is a substantial rather
than a nominal party to the action.
After he has fully rendered the debt or duty required of
him, the complainant may withdraw from the action and the
subsequent proceedings are strictly among the claimants. In the
ensuing proceedings the usual presumptions of fact and rules re-
garding weight and sufficiency of evidence apply.21
It has been held that one who has a valid contract with an-
other for after acquired goods may maintain interpleader against
a judgment creditor who seeks execution against the goods when
they come into being.22
Where a debtor's property is taken under a writ of fieri
facias, a deed of trust creditor may file a bill of interpleader
against the other attacking creditors.23
Note, that in the Turnbull case, interpleader is not brought
by the stakeholder but by one of the parties claiming the fund.
This is the usual procedure in cases in which the fund is seized
by one of the claimants through judicial process. In such situa-
tions the stakeholder is relieved of his duty of due diligence in
bringing interpleader and it becomes the duty of the other ad-
verse claimant to intervene for his own protection.2
4
21 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Moore, 177 Va. 341, 14 S.E.2d
307 (1941).
22 First Nat. Bank v. Turnbul, 32 Grart. (73 Va.) 695, 34 Am.Rep. 791
(1880); Leftwich v. Wells, 101 Va. 255, 43 S.E. 364, 99 Am.St.Rep. 865
(1903).
2
-sFirst Nat. Bank v. Turnbull, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 695, 34 Am.Repl 791
(1880).
24 Whan v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 81 W.Va. 338,94 S.E. 365 (1917).
The defendants or claimants in an action of interpleader
shall be all those who assert a claim to the fund or other thing in
dispute, whether in their own right or as the lawful representa-
tives of others.25
E. An Outline of the Bill and its Contents
The complainant must allege in the bill that all the elements
requisite to interpleader exist in the case. This includes the
special jurisdictional elements already treated in the section on
jurisdiction. Therefore, the bill will allege:
1. That the same thing, debt or duty is claimed by both or
all parties against whom relief is sought;
2. That there is privity between the adverse claims;
3. That complainant has no interest in the subject matter;
and
4. That complainant has not and will not incur any inde-
pendent liability to either or any of the claimants prior
to final disposition of the matter at issue.26
The bill must be accompanied by an affidavit affirming the
fact that the complainant does not collude with any claimantY
When the subject matter is money, the complainant must
expressly offer in his bill to bring the same into court. How-
ever, a demurrer will not be sustained upon failure to do so,
although the fund must be brought into court before any orders
will be made in the case.28
Also to be included in the bill is a prayer for relief asking
that the claimants be required to set forth their claims.
An injunction is sometimes requested to stay proceedings of
any claimant already in motion.
F. Hearing, Decree and Appeal Thereon
Claimants are entitled to a hearing, generally limited in
25 George v. Pilcher, 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 299, 26 An.Rep. 350 (1877).
2 6 Runlde v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
27 Barton, Chancery Practice, Sec. V (3rd Ed.) (1926).
28 Ibid.
scope to the issue, should interpleader be granted. It is this
portion of the proceedings that was referred to earlier as the
"first stage" of interpleader.
In an action properly brought the complainant is dismissed
with his costs, and if the question between the claimants is ready
for decision, the court will make a decree at the first hearing.
If the question is not ready as between the claimants, the court
will direct an action or an issue, or will refer the matter to a
master to ascertain the disputed facts, depending upon the nature
of the suit.
The only decree which can be made in favor of the com-
plainant and against the claimants in the initial stage of an inter-
pleader suit is that the bill has been properly filed giving the
complainant leave to bring the disputed property into court, dis-
charging him from further liability, and directing the defendants
to interplead the conflicting claims among themselves. When
the property is brought into court and accepted, the decree is
final as to the complainant."
In accord with the settled rules of procedure governing ap-
peal, a decree dismissing the bill will not be disturbed on appeal
when there is no bill of exceptions, no certificate of evidence,
and no intimation of what documents were read or rejected.
There were depositions in the record, but the decree did not refer
to them, although it stated that evidence was heard. The court
concluded that they had been inserted in the record after the
decree and thus could not be considered on appeal.30
G. Costs.
The rule is rather liberal regarding costs, at least where the
complainant is concerned. It has been held that where a bill of
interpleader has been filed in good faith, the complainant should
have his costs, including attorney's fee, out of the fund brought
by him into court.31
If infants who are necessary parties to the suit have no estate
which the court can reach, the fee to their guardian ad litem is a
29 Jones v. Buckingham Slate Co., 116 Va. 120, 81 S.E. 28 (1914).
30 Joslyn v. State Bank, 86 Va. 287, 10 S.E. 166 (1889).
3 1Pettus v. Hendricks, 113 Va. 326, 74 S.E. 191 (1912).
proper charge in the first instance upon the fund to be admin-
istered.P
Ultimately, the claimant against whom the decree is ren-
dered will bear the burden of the costs of the complainant as well
as those of the other claimant.
PART II. STATUTORY INTERPLEADER
In Virginia, as in most jurisdictions, the application of the
remedy of interpleader has been clarified and extended by statute.
It is well established, nevertheless, that the statutory provisions
do not supersede the ancient equitable remedy, which remains
available, but merely provide an additional and concurrent
remedy.34
In this section, as in those which have preceded it, particular
emphasis shall be given those special rules of procedure peculiar
to interpleader alone.
Practically all jurisdictions now have what may be called a
"general" statutory provision for interpleader varying somewhat
in different jurisdictions, of course, but alike in nearly all cases
in that they make the remedy available at law, and again in vary-
ing degrees, as we shall see, remove some of its procedural hard-
ships. It is necessary in regard to the restrictive aspects of the
procedure in interpleader at common law to understand to what
extent these restrictions have been retained in connection with
the general statutory remedy. This section will state the present
state of procedural law surrounding interpleader by statute in
Virginia with special reference to those procedures peculiar to
interpleader in particular.
In Virginia the general interpleader statute, which also has
a provision for a summary proceeding, provides as follows:35
Interpleader: Upon affidavit of a defendant in any
action that he claims no interest in the subject matter
of the action, but that some third party has a claim
a2 Ibid.
33 Beers v. Spooner, 9 Leigh (36 Va.) 153 (1838).
34 Runkle v. Runkle, 112 Va. 788, 72 SE. 695 (1911); Report of Revisors,
p. 764 (1849).
35 Va. Code, §8-226 (1950).
thereto, and that he does not collude with such third
party, but is ready to pay or dispose of the subject
matter of the action as the court may direct, the court
may make order requiring such third party to appear and
state the nature of his claim, and maintain or relinquish
it, and in the meantime stay the proceedings in such
action. If such third party, on being served with such
order, shall not appear, the court may, on proof of the
plaintiff's right, render judgment for him, and declare
such third party to be forever barred of any claim in
respect to the subject matter, either against the plaintiff
or the original defendant, or his personal representa-
tive. If such third party, on being so served shall ap-
pear, the court shall allow him to make himself de-
fendant in the action, and either in such action or other-
wise, cause such issue or issues to be tried as it may be
prescribed, and may direct which party shall be con-
sidered the plaintiff in the issue, and shall give judg-
ment upon the verdict rendered on such trial, or, if a
jury be waived by the parties interested, shall determine
their claims in a summary way.
It is hardly necessary to point out that it is required now as
at common law that the same thing, debt or duty be claimed by
each adverse claimant. As pointed out previously, any restriction
upon jurisdiction imposed by this rule is inherent in the concept
of interpleader itself.
The words of the statute leave no doubt that interpleader
under the Virginia statute is still limited to those complainants
who have no interest in the subject matter of the dispute as was
the case under the common law remedy. Without repeating the
criticisms and suggestions made with regard to this limitation as
applied to the common law equitable doctrine, it is well to refer
to them here and to note that they apply to the statutory remedy
as well.
A further limitation on the common law doctrine was that
the remedy was available only to those complainants who had
incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants be-
fore final disposition of the matter at issue. The statute does not
indicate whether this restriction is to be retained. However,
in the case of Nicholas v. Harrison Building & Supply Corn-
pany,36 a rule is presented which is at least analogous, if not
identical, to the common law limitation. In that case, defend-
ants, for whom a building was being erected, agreed with plain-
tiff, who furnished supplies to a contractor, to retain sufficient
funds to pay plaintiff for the material furnished. It was held
that defendants were not mere stakeholders of this fund, because
they guaranteed the debt to plaintiff, and hence were not entitled
to have plaintiff and mechanics lienors interpleaded but were re-
quired to litigate their respective claims. Note that this result
ensued even though complainant was quite willing to give up the
subject matter in dispute and claimed no interest therein. The
remedy was denied because of the independent liability which
complainant had incurred to one claimant.
Another important limitation of the statutory version of in-
terpleader, and one which did not exist at common law, is that
the statute applies only when there is an action pending37 In
Runkle v. Runkle,48 the complainant was denied relief under the
statute because there was no action pending and was, therefore,
left to resort to the common law remedy in equity. Complain-
ant's bill in equity was dismissed, however, on the grounds of
lack of privity between the claimants.
Because complainant in the Runkle case could not bring his
suit within the scope of the statute, it was not necessary for the
court to determine whether the most important common law lim-
itation upon interpleader, that which requires privity between
the claimants, applies to the, statutory remedy. The court was
entirely silent upon this point, and, unfortunately, there seems to
have been no case which expressly determines the applicability
of the privity limitation to the statutory version of interpleader.
The statute itself does not expressly require privity.
Furthermore, a brief review of the law in other jurisdictions
indicates that there is no uniformity regarding the retention or
removal of the privity requisite regarding statutory interpleader,
although (as might be expected) the trend is away from privity.
It has been held that in states practicing under a code, where
36 181 Va. 207, 24 SE.2d 452 (1943).
37 Va. Code, §8-226 (1950).
38 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
an action of interpleader is merely a substitute for a bill in equity,
the action is governed by the same rules.39
The rule with regard to privity was specifically abrogated
by the general statute on interpleader in California in 1881.40
In Gillespie v. Citizens National Bank of Weatherford,41 the
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas determined that privity was not
one of the essential elements of interpleader provided by statute
in Texas.2
However, the Supreme Court of Iowa in Hoyt v. Gouge,
interpleading under an Iowa statute" similar to the Virginia
statute in question which also made no mention of privity, held
that an action under the statute would not lie where the defend-
ants are making claims against the plaintiff under distinct and in-
dependent contracts, not necessarily in conflict, but payment of
one of which would not extinguish the other.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that persons
having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants
and may be required to interplead when their claims are such
that the plaintiff may be exposed to double or multiple liability.
No ground for objection to this joinder is furnished by the fact
that the claims of the several claimants or the title on which their
claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical,
but are adverse to and independent of one another.45
The present transition is indicated by the cases in Alabama.
The Supreme Court held that since the statutory remedy pro-
vided a short method of accomplishing the purpose of a bill of
interpleader in equity, it would lie only when the facts would
authorize relief in equity.46  In Gibson v. Goldthtwaite,47 the
Alabama Court said:
39 Board of Education v. Scoville, 13 Kans. 17 (1874); St. Louis Life Ins. Co.
v. Alliance Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Minn. 7 (1876).
4 0 Sec. 386, Code of Civil Procedure (1881); See Fox v. Sutton, 127 Cal. 515,
59 Pac. 939 (1900).
4197 S.W.2d 310 (1936).
42 Art. 4656, Vernon's Tex. Civ. St. (1936).
43 125 Iowa 603, 101 N.W. 464 (1904).
44 Sec. 3407, Iowa Code (1897).
45 Rule 22 (1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1949).
46 Stewart v. Sample, 168 Ala. 274, 53 So. 182 (1910).
47 7 Ala. 281, 42 Am.Dec. 592 (1845).
In the case of adverse independent titles or demands not
derived from a common source, but each asserted as
wholly paramount to the other, the party holding the
fund or other thing in dispute must defend himself as
well as he can against each separate demand, and a court
of equity will not grant him relief on a bill of inter-
pleader.
However, in McDonald v. McDonald,48 the Alabama Su-
preme Court cites with approval the case of Northwestern Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Kidder,49 in which it was indicated
that the more recent authorities feel that it is, ". . . questionable,
however, whether the doctrine of privity commonly recognized
in respect of bills of interpleader applies to the statutory inter-
pleader."
With the preceding review of the law in other jurisdictions
as a background, we may proceed to determine the state of law
in Virginia in this connection. As stated previously, neither the
statute nor the case law tells us specifically whether the privity
limitation applies to the general statutory provision for inter-
pleading; therefore, any conclusion must be by implication from
cases applying the statute, and the cases have not been numerous.
In the majority of cases under the statute, there was privity be-
tween the claimants sufficient to meet the common law concept
of privity. 0 In fact, only one case was found in which relief
was granted under the statute where no privity in any sense ex-
isted between the parties claiming the subject matter.51 In that
case the subject matter of the controversy was funds paid by
decedent to a mutual benefit society. Under its contract with
decedent the society was to "assign" those funds as stipulated by
decedent. The funds being held by the mutual benefit society
48 212 Ala. 137, 102 So. 38 (1924).
49 162 Ind. 382, 66 L.R.A. 89, 70 N.E. 489, 1 Ann. Ca. Note, p. 513 (1904).
0See Turner-Jennings Motor Co. v. Beckley's Administrators, 137 Va. 435,
119 S.E. 115 (1923): claims by assignee of the same lease; Parks v.
Whitbank, 177 Va. 461, 14 S.E.2d 281 (1941): tenant granted inter-
pleader against dual claimants of the rent, both claimants having denied
their tide from the same grantor; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Mutual Ins.
etc. Co., 193 Va. 269, 68 S.E.2d 541 (1952): Insurance Company
allowed to interplead claims by the insured and an alleged assignee of
the insured.
51 Leftwich v. Wells, 101 Va. 255, 43 S.E. 362 (1903).
were claimed by the beneficiary under the decedent's contract
with the company and by decedent's husband who alleged a
separate contract between himself and decedent. Clearly there
was no privity between the claimants; yet relief was granted, and
the funds were awarded to the beneficiary.
Therefore, on the basis of this decision, considering the
silence of the Code regarding the privity requirement, and in the
absence of any case specifically denying the remedy for want of
privity between the claimants, it is thought that the privity re-
quirement does not limit the application of the statutory remedy
under this general and most important statute. Certainly, it has
not been a limitation thus far.
There are also other statutes providing interpleader and sim-
ilar remedies in certain specific instances which should receive
some consideration. These statutes, which for the sake of con-
venience can be called "specialized statutes", are the "more dis-
tant relatives" of equitable interpleader and are of little im-
portance in the scope of this paper.
The foregoing discussion of the procedure under the gen-
eral statute does not apply in most instances to the specialized
statutes. In general, however, it may be said that the privity re-
quirement does not apply. That requirement, if applicable,
would all but totally defeat the purposes of any of the specialized
statutes because of their very nature. Their application in a
number of cases indicates that the privity requirement does not
apply.52 The other common law restrictions on interpleader
apply in varying degrees, but they do not constitute an important
limitation. The remainder of this section on statutory inter-
pleader is a summary of the specialized statutes provided by the
Code.
A substitute for replevin, first established by the Code in
1849,53 provides for interpleader to test the ownership of prop-
erty levied on by a warrant or distress or execution.M The rem-
52 See Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S.E. 902 (1925);
Littell v. Lansburg Furniture Co., 96 Va. 540, 32 S.E. 63 (1899); Starke
v. Scott, 78 Va. 180 (1883); Kern v. Wyatt, 89 Va. 885, 17 S.E. 549
(1893).
5s Cited, Kiser v. Hensley, 123 Va. 536, 541, 96 S.E. 777, 779 (1918).
54 Va. Code, §8-227 (1950).
edy is available to the officer making the levy, to the plaintiff in
the distress warrant or execution, and to the claimant of the
property.
A further provision 5 allows warehousemen to interplead
conflicting claims to goods in storage:
If more than one person claim the title or possession of
the goods, the warehouseman may, either as a defense to
an action brought against him for non-delivery of the
goods, or as an original suit, whichever is appropriate,
require all known claimants to interplead.
Interpleader is also provided in cases of attachment to pro-
tect the claims of third parties in the property attached. The
Code allows any person having a claim to property attached to
file a petition to have his rights determined at any time before
the property attached is sold or the proceeds of the sale paid to
the plaintiff under the judgment. Upon the demand of either
claimant, a jury may be impanelled to hear the cause. 6
It has been held with regard to this section that its evident
purpose was to protect the equitable as well as the legal rights
and interests of third persons in the attachment proceedings, and
the lien of the attaching creditor should be subordinated to all
such rights and interests as exist at the time the attachment is
levied.57
Virginia additionally provides a remedy in interpleader to
determine the validity of a claim in property held under a dis-
tress warrant or under execution of a judgment. The petition
may be made by the claimant, the officer having such process,
or the party who had the same issued.58
In Chapter 4 of the Code concerning liens of innkeepers,
livery stable and garage keepers, mechanics and bailees, a remedy
in interpleader is given to one having an interest in the property
against which such liens are sought to be enforced. The petition
55 Va. Code, § 61-20 (1950).
56Va. Code, §8-560 (1950); And see Litter v. Lansburg Furniture Co., 96
Va. 540, 32 S.E. 63 (1899).
57 Barnes v. American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 130 S.E. 902 (1925).
58 Va. Code, § 16.1-119 (1950).
to be filed by the claimant must be filed before the property is
sold or the proceeds of the sale paid to the plaintiff under the
judgment of the trial justice or court.
A specialized statutory provision"9 for interpleader deter-
mines rights with regard to money or securities deposited with
the Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles. The deposit is one
method of proving the financial responsibility required by the
Motor Vehicle Regulations. The Code states:
The Commissioner and the State Treasurer, or either,
may proceed in equity by bill of interpleader for the
determination of any dispute as to ownership of or rights
in any deposit and may have recourse to any other
appropriate proceeding for determination of any ques-
tion that arises as to their rights or liabilities or as to
the rights or liabilities of the Commonwealth under this
Chapter.s
Conclusion
In drawing any conclusion, it is first observable that a broad-
er and more useful remedy in interpleader is now available in
Virginia because of the statutory improvements on the common
law version. Even at present, however, the remedy is certainly
not without unneeded limitations, the abrogation of which will
be required before it may fully expand to meet new situations
and realize its true potential in terms of service.
The specialized statutes have been a definite forward step
within their limited design and have generally not been limited
by the common law restrictions. Because of their limited appli-
cation, however, one seeking to interplead rival claims will more
often find it necessary to bring his case within the bounds of the
general statutory provision, which is applicable only when an
action is pending against the complainant. A complainant, filing
his bill for interpleader before an action by one of the claimants
is brought against him, will find himself required to meet the
rigid jurisdictional requisites of the ancient equitable version of
interpleader. These were the circumstances in Runkle v. Run-
19 Va. Code, 546-478 (1950).
60 Ibid.
kle," ' complainant's bill being finally dismissed for want of priv-
ity between the claimants.
Even when the general statutory provision is applicable, any
interest retained by the complainant in the subject matter of the
dispute or any independent liability which the complainant may
incur to either of the claimants before final disposition of the
matter defeats jurisdiction. A statute expressly removing both
of these limitations is desirable as both limitations are artificial
and without any basis in the nature of interpleader itself.
While there is no reason to believe that the privity require-
ment is presently a limitation upon the jurisdiction of courts
applying any interpleader statute, a specific provision expressly
removing the privity requirement, similar to that of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of the California Code considered
above, would be more satisfactory from the standpoint of cer-
tainty. -
K. H. L.
61 112 Va. 788, 72 S.E. 695 (1911).
